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SUMMARY 
This paper expZores what wouZd happen to a chromosomaZ seg-
ment that evoZves randomZy, without the surveiZZance of naturaZ 
seZection. In these circumstances a singZe segment present in 
some individuaZ organism at any given starting time wiZZ eventu-
aZZy spread through the popuZation untiZ it becomes fixed in the 
entire gene-pooZ - or more property the "segment pooZ". At the 
same time, the continuaZ deZetion, dupZication and insertion of 
nucZeotides in a randomZy-evoZving segment of DNA wiZZ Zead to 
fixation of individuaZ nucZeotides in the totaZ pooZ of nucZeo-
tides in aZZ the homoZogous segments in the species. When this 
genetic drift at the nucZeotide ZeveZ is examined in detaiZ, 
it is seen to provide a simpZe, naturaZ soZution to a contem-
porary probZem in moZecuZar evoZution: the prevaZence of appar-
entZy functionZess segments consisting of simpZe nucZeotide se-
quences repeated tandemZy thousands to miZZions of times. The 
soZution exempZifies a cZass of scientific theories that are dif-
ficuZt or impossibZe to corroborate experimentaZZy, even though 
they may be inteZZectuaZZy satisfying and of considerabZe prac-
ticaZ importance in the progress of science. 
INTRODUCTION 
Somewhere I have read of a museum that has on display a 
magnificent beard of stupendous length - let us say six feet. 
Perhaps it was like the beard shown in vivo in Fig. 1. But its 
length is by no means its most remarkable quality. Scientific 
analysis of its architecture revealed that no individual hair 
in it measured more than twelve inches! It is apparent that 
some of us would get on much better without a comb and brush. 
In certain respects such a beard may be a more fitting 
image of evolutionary descent than the more usual image of an 
evolutionary tree. Just as the beard's overall continuity is 
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Figure 1. A magnificent beard of stupendous length. 
not- re-fleeted in the continu-ity of its individua-1- h-airs, so also 
the continuous lines of descent leading from remote ancestors to 
contemporary living things may not be reflected in continuous 
lines of descent of their individual DNA nucleotides. Nucleo-
tidyl lineages are continually becoming extinct, even in flour-
ishing organisms. This extinction is balanced partly by over-
expansion of other nucleotidyl lineages, and partly by the de 
nova creation of new nucleotidyl lineages. 
This rather unconventional picture of the evolutionary 
process comes from a consideration of how DNA would evolve if it 
were not subject to natural selection - if heritable changes 
accumulated at random. This type of evolution is often called 
non-darwinian. I hope you will not think that I am foolishly 
going to try to argue against the role of natural selection in 
evolutionary change. What I do maintain, however, is that it 
is plausible to suppose that at some epochs, some segments of 
the genomes of most species are largely relieved from the sur-
veillance of natural selection. The accumulation of changes in 
the nucleotide sequences of such genomic segments becomes a s t o-
chastic process - that is, a process governed by chance. I will 
argue that certain striking characteristics of the genomes of 
higher organisms find a much simpler and more elegant explana-
tion in non-darwinian theory than in terms of natural selection. 
GENETIC DRIFT OF SEGMENTS IN A SEGMENT-POOL 
At the heart of non-darwinian theory is the concept of 
genetic drift, as first propounded by Sewall Wright (WRIGHT 
1931) . To illustrate drift, I will focus on one particular seg-
ment of the nucleotide sequence in one particular chromosome of 
a hypothetical species. The set of all allelic segments in the 
species constitutes what we can call a "segment pool". A segment 
NON-DARWINIAN EVOLUTION 107 
2D-
V') 
z 
0 
-~ 
::530-
z 
~ 
-10-
so-
AAAAAA 
LINES 
EXTINCT 
E 
F 
C 
B 
D 
Figure 2. Fixation of DNA segments by random sampling of ga-
metes. See the text. 
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pool is analogous to the more familiar gene pool, but is in-
tended to be noncommittal about the functional role (if any) 
of the segment under consideration; if in fact the segment hap-
pens to be a functional gene, the segment pool can also be 
called a gene pool. But here we are particularly interested in 
segments of the genome that are not functional - at least for 
the time being. Under these ' assumptions, the probability of a 
given segment in the contemporary segment pool contributing to 
the segment pool of the next generation does not depend on the 
state of that segment - that is, the mutations it carries. All 
segments in the pool are intrinsically neutral as far as nat-
ural selection is concerned. Let us make the additional assump-
tion that there are no extrinsic factors contributing to non-
uniformity of the transmission of segments from one generation 
to the next. Thus I assume that the organismal population 
breeds at random and that the segment is not linked closely 
enough to any non-neutral segment of the genome to affect its 
probability of survival. Even under these assumptions, which 
maximize the uniformity of transmission of the segments from 
one generation to the next, there will be a certain random vari-
ance from perfect uniformity. Each generation can be seen as a 
random sample of the gametes produced by the previous generation, 
and sampling error will lead to a certain irreducible variance 
in transmission- of segments from one generation eo the next. I 
have illustrated this variance schematically in Fig. 2, which 
follows the descent of the segments in a hypothetical segment 
pool consisting of six segments in each generation - as would 
be the case, for example, in a hypothetical population of 3 di-
ploid organisms. To simulate random sampling of gametes, one 
segment in each generation was chosen at random to leave no 
descendant segments in the next generation, and another to be 
represented by two descendants in the next generation. The for-
mer are indicated by terminations of lines of descent, the latter 
by branchings into two lines of descent. To see the effect of 
random sampling, let us imagine that we label all the segments 
in the segment pool at some starting time (as I have labeled A 
through F the segments present at generation O in Fig. 2) and 
keep track of those segments in later generations that descend 
from each of the zero-time segments. Variance in transmission 
will lead to fluctuation in the number of descendants repre-
senting the various zero-time segments, some original segments 
being underrepresented, others being overrepresented. At each 
generation, there is a finite chance that all remaining descen-
dants of a given one of the original segments will be completely 
eliminated. In Fig. 2, for example, the lineage descending from 
original segment E happens to become extinct by generation 1, 
that from Fat generation 3, and so forth, as shown in the list 
at the right-hand edge of Fig. 2. Hence, as time goes on, more 
and more of the original segments will become extinct. These 
extinctions can only be compensated by overrepresentation of 
the remaining original segments. Eventually all but one of the 
original segments must become extinct. In the parlance of popu-
lation genetics, that one surviving segment has become fixed in 
the segment pool. In Fig. 2 it happens- to be original segment 
A which becomes fixed in this sense by generation 29. 
For any epoch we choose as the contemporary time, there 
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will be an earlier generation such that all the contemporary 
segments descend from a single one of the s~gments in that earl-
ier generation. In Fig. 2, for example, the bold lines show how 
all the segments present at gerneration 29 descend from a single 
common ancestral segment at generation 18; prior to generation 
18, the segments in generation 29 are represented by a single 
line of descent. Similarly, the segments present at generation 
59 are represented by a single line of descent prior to genera-
tion 32. Thus while the total evolutionary history looks like 
a continuous beard of divergences and extinctions, the evolu-
tionary lineages leading to the segments in any one generation 
resemble an inverted tree. 
Only mutations occurring in the branches descending from 
the most recent common ancestor are inherited by some of the 
contemporary segments and not by others, and can thus contribute 
to differences among the contemporary segments. Mutations oc-
curing prior to the epoch of the most recent common ancestor-
segment cannot contribute to the heterogeneity of the contem-
porary segments; most of these mutations are lost as the line-
ages in which they occur become extinct; the remaining muta-
tions - those occurring in the single line of descent leading 
to the common ancestor - are inherited by all of the contempor-
ary segments. These latter mutations, like the segments that 
inherit them, have become fixed in the segment-pool. 
If (as we have postulated) natural selection neither fav-
ors nor disfavors mutations in the segment under consideration, 
the nucleotide sequences of the segments in the pool will di-
verge more and more from those of their ancestor-segments. Yet 
while these mutations accumulate, the segments present at any 
one generation will tend to remain relatively similar to one 
another, since heterogeneity can only accumulate during the lim-
ited time-lapse between that generation and the epoch of the 
most recent common ancestor. Thus we see that the change in 
charact~rs within a species (the characters in this case being. 
the nucleotide sequences of the segments) has direction even in 
the absence of natural selection. The absence of selection 
means, not that evolution has no direction, but rather that the 
choice of direction is random. 
Natural selection superimposes a bias on the stochastic 
transmission of segments from one generation to the next, dis-
favoring the spread of deleterious mutations and favoring the 
spread of advantageous mutations. It can be seen as a driving 
force that increases the rate at which mutations become extinct 
and fixed. Hence natural selection tends to reduce the hetero-
geneity of the segments in a segment pool by reducing the tran-
sit-time between the occurrence of mutations and their ultimate 
extinction or fixation. 
Several population geneticists, led by Kimura (KIMURA 1968), 
have pointed out that the very large heterogeneity that is actu-
ally observed at single loci in many species of higher organism 
finds a ready and simple explanation in the hypothesis that many 
mutations are nearly neutral as far as natural selection is con-
cerned and therefore are fixed and extinguished at the leisurely 
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pace characteristic of genetic drift . I must warn you , however , 
that this view is highly controversial - as indeed it was when 
Sewall Wright (WRIGHT 1931) first propounded the theory of ge-
netic drift . The "selectionists" (as the opponents of the neu-
tral mutation theory are often called) have managed to devise 
schemes of selection which might account for the observed het-
erogeneity (MILKMAN 1976) . Unaccountably they seem to triumph 
in thus rescuing conventional evolutionary theory from simpli-
fication by means of further complications . In fact , the selec -
tionists have gone on to uncover some apparent discrepancies 
between the observations and non-fdarwinian theory. I say " ap-
parent" discrepancies because I 1uppose that if the selection-
ists were to allow as much scope to the non-darwinian imagina-
tion in clearing up these discre~ancies as they have to their 
own imaginations in devising their selective schemes , the dis-
crepancies will largely disappear (KIMURA 1976). No doubt you 
will divine on which side of this controversy my sympathies lie . 
GENETIC DRIFT OF INDIVIDUAL NUCLEOTIDES 
IN THE TOTAL NUCLEOTIDE POOL 
So far I have been discussing the descent of segments as 
if they were indivisible units , but of course in reality they 
are composed of nucleotides . The evolutionary lineages I have 
been discussing ought properly to be regarded as bundles of lin-
eages representing the descents of individual base-pairs . For 
the most part these lineages run strictly parallel to each other 
because of the extreme fidelity of DNA replication . There will 
be occasional irregularities , however . Homologous crossover 
between segments would be represented .by reciprocal e x change of 
parts of the bundles corresponding to the two recombining seg-
ments ; this can lead to non-paraljlelism between the lineages for 
different positions within the s e gment under consideration . 
This does not fundamentally alter the picture , however , since 
all the arguments can simply be interpreted as applying individ-
ually to subsegments that are sufficiently short - single base-
pairs if necessary - that no intra-subsegment recombinants sur-
vive among the contemporary segments . 
A more fundamental type of irregularity is due to dele-
tion and duplication of nucleotides , which are known to occur 
spontaneously in DNA . These deletions and duplications cause 
an unevenness in the transmission of the nucleotides from one 
generation to the next in a lineage of segments that is exactly 
analogous to the unevenness in the transmission of segments from 
one generation to the next in a population of organisms . The 
same conclusions therefore apply : nucleotides become fixed in 
the " linear pool" of nucleotides that constitutes a DNA segment . 
At the same time , of course , the segments themselves are con-
tinually becoming fi x ed in the segment pool . Ultimately , then , 
the descendants of a single nucleotide-pair present at an arbi -
trary starting time will spread until they come to occupy all 
the positions in all the allelic segments in the segment pool . 
In other words, the total nucleotide pool - that is , the pool of 
all base- pairs in all the allelic segments in all the individu-
als in a species - will be connected to the remote past by the 
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precarious thread of a single lineage of nucleotide-pairs. 
Truly it is a precarious thread. If it could be traced 
back far enough, it ought to come to an end. This end corre-
sponds to the spontaneous insertion of one or more nucleotides, 
another process known to occur in DNA sequences. Such inserted 
nucleotides, ,unlike the extra nucleotides added to DNA as a re-
sult of some form of duplication, cannot be said to have de-
scended from any prior nucleotides; from an evolutionary point 
of v iew insertions are de novo creations. These nucleotidyl 
par venus have quite as good a chance of being ultimately fixed 
as their neighbors of more venerable lineage in the extreme de-
mocracy of non-darwinian theory. Eventually, of course, some of 
them will be fixed, and the total nucleotide pool will hang sus-
pended from one or more tiny acts of spontaneous creation. We 
have come full circle to my starting image of a beard of life, 
whose nethermost hairs are unconnected to the chin of the First 
Creator. 
A NON-DARWIN.IAN THEORY OF REPETITIVE DNA 
Personally I find this image appealing, but I doubt that 
in reality ~ny segment of DNA survives long enough without ei-
ther accidental extinction or acquisition of some physiological 
role for the full non-darwinian development outlined above to 
occur. Nevertheless certain portions of the theory, such as the 
slow fixation of neutral mutations, may illuminate observable 
phenomena, as we have already seen. I would like to focus on 
another such part of the theory. 
We saw above that the deletion and duplication of nucleo-
tides lead to the fixation of nucleotides in what I called the 
"linear pool" of base-pairs that constitutes a DNA segment. One 
way such deletions and duplications are known to arise is by un-
equal crossover. As shown in Fig . 3, an unequal crossover pro-
duces one recombinant molecule with a deletion of a block of nu-
cleotides and another recombinant molecule with a tandem dupli-
cation of the same block of nucleotides. Such unequal cross-
overs may be one explanation of how tandem duplications arise in 
nonrepetitive DNA. However, since the participating DNA mole-
cules are not homologous at the point of crossover, this type of 
unequal crossover is presumably very much less likely than equal 
crossover between homologously aligned DNA molecules. But onc e an 
array of two or more tandem repeats arises in the DNA sequence 
(whether by nonhomologous unequal crossover or by some other 
mechanism), unequal crossover can occur between different re-
peats aligned in register, as shown in Fig. 4. Since DNA mole-
cules aligne~ in this fashion are homologous at the point of 
crossover, this type of unequal crossover ought to be relatively 
efficient compared to other modes of deletion and duplication. 
This homologous but unequal crossover has the effect of deleting 
or tandemly duplicating a block of adjacent repeats in the tan-
dem array, as shown in Fig. 4. Because of the efficiency of 
homologous but unequal crossover relative to other forms of du-
plication, once arrays of two or more tandem repeats arise in a 
segment of DNA, duplications ought. to take the form predominantly 
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Figure 3. Unequal crossover results in deletion or tandem du-
plication of a block of adjacent nucleotides, depending on which 
(if either) of the two rec.ombinant chromosomes survives random 
extinction in future generations. 
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Figure 4. Homologous but unequal crossover between tandem ar-
rays results in deletion or tandem duplication of a block of ad-
jacent repeats. Because of extensive homology at the point of 
crossover, this type of crossover is presumed to be much more 
likely than unequal crossover between non-repetitive DNA sequen-
ces. 
of expansion of some of these tandem arrays. These expansions 
are more or less compensated by the contraction of other tandem 
arrays and by the deletion of non-repetitious portions of the 
DNA sequence. Ultimately, therefore, a single array of tandem 
repeats must expand to occupy the entire segment . In other 
words, a segment of DNA which evolves entirely at random ought 
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inevitably to become tandemly repetitious. Computer simula-
tions confirm this deduction. Initially random, non-repetitive 
DNA sequences inevitably turn into tandem repeats when subjected 
to multiple rounds of random mutation and random unequal cross-
over (SMITH 1976). 
Tandem arrays such as these abound in the DNA of eukary-
otes. The non-darwinian theory provides a simple explanation 
for their prevalence in terms of the random accumulation of ran-
dom mutations and random unequal crossovers. Alternative theo-
ries of repetitious DNAs attribute them to special replication 
mechanisms or to natural selection resulting from some physio-
logical role the repetitious sequences play (BRITTEN & KOHNE 
1968; FRY & SALSER 1977). In thus invoking special mechanisms 
or physiological roles ad hoe to explain the occurrence of se-
quences which would have a strong tendency to evolve anyway, 
these theories must, I think, be accounted gratuitously compli-
cated and therefore inferior. 
THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF UNCORROBORABLE THEORIES 
From another point of view, however, the foregoing non-
darwinian theory of repetitive DNA is very unsatisfactory. An 
enormous variety of different repetitive patterns could arise in 
the manner described above, and few conceivable patterns could 
be taken as contradictory to the theory. This capacity to ex-
plain nearly everything is not, as might be thought at first, a 
strength, but a weakness, of the theory. The philosopher Karl 
Popper made this point quite well, I think, in a discussion of 
the all-explanatory theories of Marx, Freud, and Adler, which 
were all the rage in the Vienna of his youth. "The most charac-
teristic element in this situation," Popper writes, ''seemed to 
me the incessant stream of confirmations, of observations which 
'verified' the theories in question ..•• A Marxist could not open 
a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence 
for his interpretation of history; not only in the news, but 
also in its presentation .•. and especially of course in what the 
paper did not say. The Freudian analysts emphasized that their 
theories were constantly verified by their 'clinical observa-
tions'. As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal ex-
perience. Once, in 1919, I reported to him a case which to me 
did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no dif-
ficulty in analysing in terms of his theory of inferiority feel-
ings. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. 
'Because of my thousandfold experience,' he replied; whereupon 
I could not help saying 'And with this new case, I suppose, your 
experience has become thousand-and-one-fold'" (POPPER 1963). 
Popper's philosophy of science seeks to make a .distinction 
between genuine science and pseudoscience, which, though it is 
often embedded in a confusing welter of observations (one thinks 
of the astrologer's charts, or of the tracts of the Transcenden-
tal Meditators) bears a different relationship to its empirical 
base than does genuine science. "Every 'good' scientific theo-
ry," Popper claims, 'is a prohibition: it forbids certain 
things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it 
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is .... Confirming evidence should not count except when it is 
the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that 
it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to 
falsify the theory .... Some genuinely testable theories, when 
found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers - for 
example, by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption .... 
Such a procedure ... rescues the theory from refutation only at 
the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific 
status" (POPPER 1963). 
Popper's view has come to be the conventional wisdom in 
science today, though Popper himself is given much less credit 
for it than he deserves. The idea that a theory should be test-
able has become so much a truism that it is not impossible for 
a lecturer to propose some wildly implausible theory and then 
avert boos and catcalls by intimidatingly pointing out at the 
end of his talk that his theory has the virtue of being testable. 
Judged by Popper's criterion, I'm afraid the foregoing non-
darwinian theory of repetitive DNAs is sadly lacking in scienti-
fic status. It is predictable that evidence contrary to it will 
accumulate steadily (FRY & SALSER 1977). It would be surprising, 
for example, if some repetitive DNAs which now seem purposeless 
do not turn out to have pnysioiogical roles and tobe maintained 
to some degree by natural selection. Such an empirical observa-
tion would certainly refute the most extreme form of the non-
darwinian theory. But it would not damage a more relaxed the-
ory that (for example) would allow occasional repetitive arrays 
that arose by chance to acquire physiological roles adventi-
tiously. Such ad hoc modifications, as Popper points out and as 
I'm sure we all agree, weaken a scientific theory by making it 
even less predictive and more indefinite than before. But in my 
opinion it is a grave error to be too hasty to abandon a theory 
because of ad hoc modifications. If the modifications are plau-
sible, the theory may still be scientifically important - per-
haps much more important than more testable but less plausible 
rival theories - even if it is less corroborable. The impor-
tance of such quasi-uncorrobor~ble theories lies in providing 
possible solutions to problems. In the present instance, the 
widespread occurrence of repetitive DNAs posed the problem of 
their origin. At first it seemed that the solution would take 
one of two forms: either a fundamental physiological role would 
be found for them, so that their origin could be attributed to 
the driving force of natural selection, or some special replica-
tive mechanism would be shown to operate in chromosomes to pro-
duce tandem arrays. The non-darwinian theory, even burdened 
with ad hoc modifications, provides a plausible third solution, 
according to which no physiological role or special replication 
mechanism need be invoked. The availability of this solution 
might protect us from a prolonged search for physiological roles 
or special replicative mechanisms that may not exist, or that 
if they are found, may still not be the true solution to the 
problem at hand. 
I think it is clear that the scientific weight of a theory, 
both as an explanation valued for its own sake and as a pragma-
tic guide to future research, must take into account its a priori 
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plausibility as well as the degree (if any) to which it is sup-
ported by any empirical evidence. .The pragmatic importance of 
a priori considerations might be shown by two contrasting exam-
ples. On the one hand, the theory of natural selection, which 
holds that heritable changes arise preadaptively without regard 
to the biological need they may happen to serve, ought (I'm sure 
you all will agree with me here) to deter us from wasting our 
careers searching for a direct causal connection between bio-
logical needs and heritable changes. By contrast, the theory 
of Special Creation, which holds that God created the species, 
ought not to deter us from searching for evolutionary links a-
mong the past and present species of living things. Testability 
is irrelevant to the relative scientific merits of these two 
theories. Natural selection is a notoriously untestable theory: 
what possible observation about living things would we as work-
ing biologists, thoroughly indoctrinated with the Darwinian 
view, be willing to accept as a refutation of the theory? Spe-
cial creation is a much more testable theory: it is clearly 
refutable by the discovery of a single example of a "missing 
link" between species. Of course, it is maintained by "evolu-
tionists" ~f I may so call the adherents of the materialistic 
religion of Darwin and his disciples) that a few such missing 
links have been found, and they have devised ingenious explana-
tions for why missing links are rare in the fossil record. Un-
derstandably, they become quite annoyed when their hard-won evi-
dence for missing links is disputed, often with a fine disregard 
for details, by the Special Creationists. But the fact that 
Special Creationists have rendered their own hypothesis irrefut-
able by a fixed policy of refusing to consider contrary evidence 
seriously does not vitiate their argument that evolutionism is 
no less an irrefutable system of belief than Special Creation. 
If untestable theories are to be relegated to the realm of meta-
physics, what are we to answer to the Special Creationists' con-
tention that the teaching of evolutionism to the exclusion of 
Special Creation in the public schools amounts to the establish-
ment of an atheistic religion? 
Even in the field of . the empirical corroboration of theo-
ries, to which it particularly refers, Popper's theory of theo-
ries seems defective (GROVER 1974). Despite the emphasis he and 
most scientists give to testability, in practice empirical cor-
roboration of theories, especially in biology, seldom involves 
a true test in Popper's sense. For it is very seldom that a 
theory cannot be rescued from contrary evidence by plausible 
ad hoc assumptions that do not greatly diminish its scientific 
merit. Corroborating evidence has much more significance in the 
progress of science (at least biological science) than contrary 
evidence, and even very unpredictive, irrefutable theories can 
nonetheless be corr.oborated. These empirical corroborations 
have I think a common logical structure, which I will try to 
cast in a probabilistic form. .Corroboration starts from empir-
ical data bearing on the theory. On the one hand, one computes, 
at least intuitively and unconsciously, the likelihood that one 
would obtain those particular data given the theory in question; 
I will call this the probabilit¥ of the evidence given the the-
ory, and symbolize it <evidenceltheory(0)>, where the argument 
0 distinguishes the theory of interest from the alternative 
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theories. On the other hand, one computes what I may call the 
a priori likelihood of the same empirical data. This ' a priori 
likelihood of the evidence can be decomposed into a sum of the 
form 
E<theory(i)><evidenceitheory(i)>; 
i 
here <theory(i)> is the a priori likelihood of theory(i), which 
is based on our background knowledge (including the results of 
previous observations), and the summation is over all theories, 
including the theory of interest theory(0). The ratio of these 
two probabilities 
<evidence theory(0)> 
~<theory(i)><evidence theory(i)> 
1 
I will call the corroboration index. If the index is greater 
than 1, the evidence tends to corroborate the theory; if it is 
less than 1, it tends to discorroborate it. 
Even a highly unpredictive theory, for which no particular 
empirical~ bservation roliows with a high probability, can nev-
ertheless be strongly corroborated provided the empirical data 
have an even smaller a priori probability. Let me illustrate 
the use of the corroboration index. We all probably agree that 
observing Mendelian segregation of a character strongly corrob-
orates Mendel's theory of inheritance. This cannot be because 
Mendel's theory entails Mendelian segregation of characters: 
there are lots of reasons why a character might not segregate 
in a Mendelian fashion, such as multigenic inheritance, incom-
plete penetrance, etc. Indeed, I imagine that the large major-
ity of characters one might choose at random would not turn out 
to segregate according to Mendel's laws; thus, I assume that 
Mendelian segregation is quite improbable , even given the truth 
of Mendel's laws, We nevertheless accept the rare instances of 
Mendelian segregation as strong corroboration of Mendel's laws 
because the a priori probability of Mendelian segregation is 
even smaller than its probability given the truth of Mendel's 
laws, so that the corroboration index (which is the ratio of the 
two probabilities) is very much larger than 1. Conversely, we 
dismiss the frequent instances of non-mendelian segregation as 
counter-evidence, because non-mendelian segregation is not much 
less li~ely given the truth of Mendel's theory than it is a pri-
ori, so that the corroboration index is not much less than 1. 
I can now explain more fully why I think it may be very 
difficult to corroborate the non-darwinian theory of repetitive 
DNA that I described earlier, even if that theory is basically 
correct. As a stochastic theory, it is fully consistent with 
an infinite variety of particular repetitive patterns. I can-
not now think of a particular observation that wouid pe muc~ 
more probable, given the truth of the non-darwinian theory, than 
the same observation would be if we were unenlightened by the 
theory. Hence, for all evidence that I conceive of as likely 
to be obtained, the corroboration index 
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<evidenceinon-darwinian theory>/[<non-darwinian theory> 
<evidencejnon-darwinian theory>+~<alternative theory(i)> 
l. 
<evidencelalternative theory(i)>] 
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would not be much larger than l; such evidence would not weigh 
heavily in favor of the non-darwinian theory. 
A THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 
I would like to summarize my reflections on theories of 
scientific theories by proposing a unified framework in which 
the strength of a scientific theory might be assessed. It is 
by no means an original proposal; in particular, my approach is 
very similar to that of Grover Maxwell (MAXWELL 1974). I sug-
gest that in principle we might be able to compute the probabil-
ity that a particular scientific theory [theory(0)] is true, 
given the evidence we have on hand. In my proposal, this proba-
bility (symbolized <theory(0) I evidence>) equals the product of 
the a priori probability of the theory (given our background 
knowledge, including any previous evidence) times the corrobor-
ation index for the new evidence. Hence 
<theory(0) I evidence> <theory(0)><evidence theory(0)> 
~<theory(i)><evidence theory(i)> 
l. 
The probability <theory(0) jevidence> becomes a new a priori pro-
bability of theory (0); similarly the same evidertce allows the 
calculation of <theory(i) I evidence> for all the other theories; 
these numbers become the new a priori probabilities of those 
alternative theories. These new a priori probabilities can then 
be used in calculating the effects of even newer evidence. This 
formulation accords with the intuitive notion of scientific pro-
gress as the continual reevaluation of the likelihood of alter-
native theories in the light of accumulating evidence. 
Actually, assuming all the quantities involved are mean-
ingful, my proposal is true logically. In that case, it is 
identical to a certain form of Bayes' theorem, which is proved 
in elementary books on probability. But it is admittedly a 
thorny question what meaning can be attached to the a priori 
probabilities of theories. 
It seems to me that in general this Bayesian formula more 
accurately reflects the way working scientists actually weigh 
the merits of their theories than do conventional ideas about 
scientific method, even though it is often in terms of the lat-
ter that scientists write. And when the Bayesian formulation 
departs most radically from conventional ideas - namely in the 
equal intrinsic weight it gives to a priori plausibility and 
empirical corroboration in the overall assessment of a theory -
it seems to me to represent a more rational approach. 
I'm afraid I'm not, like the type of lecturer I disparaged 
earlier this evening, going to be able to close this talk by 
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pointing out that my proposal has the virtue of being testable . 
I suppose , then , that boos and catcalls are now in order . 
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